By Kelly H. Chang

Targeting how the President and the Senate effect financial coverage by way of appointing Federal Reserve Board participants, this e-book solutions 3 questions on the appointment approach and its results. First, do politicians impact financial coverage through Federal Reserve appointments? moment, who affects the process--only the President or the President and the Senate? 3rd, how is the constitution of the Federal Reserve appointment technique defined? The examine extends the research of the Federal Reserve Board to the eu primary financial institution.

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Extra info for Appointing Central Bankers: The Politics of Monetary Policy in the United States and the European Monetary Union (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

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First, the exact placement of the appointees may matter more than previously. 1, the president and Senate would previously appoint anyone to the left of x5 (x ≤ x5) in order to achieve SQ2 = L2, which is as close as possible to SQ− , the RR equilibrium policy. With multiple appointments, placements of appointees between SQ− and x5 could impede future progress toward SQ− . Therefore, the president and Senate appoint members right at SQ− if no member is at that point, or if there is already a member at SQ− , they will appoint members at or to the left of SQ− in order to maximize the future chances of getting exactly to SQ− .

If the chair has much agenda-setting power, his voting weight should be higher compared to that of the other members. Krause (1994) finds support for the chair’s ability to build consensus, and Chappell, McGregor, and Vermilyea (1998) conclude that the chair’s voting weight is higher than that of typical FOMC members. However, Chappell, McGregor, and Vermilyea (1998) also conclude that the median voter theorem, which presupposes equal voting weights, accurately represents FOMC voting behavior. 17 14 15 16 17 Given the median voter theorem, the assumption is reasonable.

But in the current constitutional setup, because the president is the agenda setter, he can use this advantage in order to obtain a point closer to or identical to his ideal point in either of the first two cases. In Case 3, who moves first does not matter because SQ1 is always the outcome. 3 an extension of the model to multiple appointments In this section, I briefly consider an extension to the model. I consider how the model would change if the president and Senate were to look ahead and bargain over a series of appointments rather than a single appointment.

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Appointing Central Bankers: The Politics of Monetary Policy by Kelly H. Chang
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